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Abstract
The paper analyses the results of interaction between suicide operatives and
bystanders in the course of 103 suicide attacks in Israel over a recent three-
year period. It shows that bystanders’ intervention tended to reduce the
casualties arising by numbers that were both statistically and practically
significant. When bystanders intervened, however, this was often at the cost of
their own lives. The value of a challenge was particularly large for suicide
missions associated with Hamas, but Hamas operations were also less likely to
meet a challenge in the first place. These findings, while preliminary, may
have implications for counter-terrorism. More systematic collection of
statistical data relating to suicide incidents would be of benefit.
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Bombers and Bystanders in Suicide
Attacks in Israel, 2000 to 2003
“The main thing is to guarantee that a large number of the enemy will be
affected. With an explosive bag or belt, the bomber has control over
vision, location, and timing.”
—Hamas leader, interviewed by Nasra Hassan, “Letter from Gaza: An
Arsenal of Believers,” The New Yorker, 19 November 2001.
“Officer Yaron Zamir said Mordechai realised the man was carrying a bag
packed with explosives and confronted him … She added: ‘We have no
doubt that the store owner paid with his life to save others.’”
—Incidents and Casualties Database (Herzlia, Israel: International
Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism), entry for 19 June 2003.
It is said that suicide attacks are highly effective at killing people. The
terrorists’ problem is that a violent action that aims to kill creates a risk to the
agent, but it is hard to make the agent safer without making the victims safer
too. The solution is an agent who is willing to die in order to kill with
relatively high probability. This is reflected in the casualties associated with
suicide attacks. Worldwide, suicide attacks account for only 3 per cent of all
the terrorist incidents that took place between 1980 and 2001, but almost half
of the deaths resulting from terrorism over the same period, excluding the
unusually heavy casualties of 9/11.1
When we study suicide attacks in more detail we find that their
effectiveness is highly variable. The catastrophic scale of 9/11 when four
coordinated blows by 19 men killed 2,973 people is at one extreme. At the
other extreme we will see that many suicide attacks injure no one but the
perpetrator. In between lies a wide spectrum of variation. This suggests that
the common perception that suicide attacks invariably result in widespread
death and injury reflects a selection bias: we are more likely to note the attacks
that succeeded than the ones that failed.
We will see that the suicide attack is a rather fragile method of causing
death and injury. The high variability in the outcomes of suicide attacks raises
an interesting problem: what factors make the difference between success and
failure? Is it chance, or do observable factors account for these differences? If
such factors exist, who controls them: the attacker, the defenders, or the
potential victims?
The events of 9/11 draw attention to the varying roles of the bystanders
who were intended to die. Four distinct but coordinated blows resulted in
many civilian deaths. In one case, that of United Airlines Flight 93, the
passengers took a hand; once they understood the threat they responded to it
2by organizing themselves to attack the hijackers.2 Their intervention took
away the hijackers’ initiative; it did not save them because it precipitated the
destruction of the aircraft and of themselves, but the hijackers never reached
their intended target in Washington and hundreds of additional deaths were
probably averted. In this case, therefore, intervention appears to have carried a
large negative residual in the number of casualties per incident.
This suggests that the effects of citizens’ responses to suicide operations
that are already in progress deserve closer study: it would be of interest to
know whether a similar effect could be found in a larger sample. Such
questions can, of course, also be tackled by more direct means, for example by
studying participant and witness perceptions gathered through interview and
examination. The use of statistics is complementary to these methods since it
offers the possibility of confirming or rejecting opinions formed on the basis
of personal observation or particular cases.
The context for this study is provided by two literatures. One literature
deals with the rational purposes underlying suicide attacks. To carry out a
suicide attack requires a large number of agents, each looking for different
payoffs, to coordinate their actions in a common enterprise. The payoffs that
arise from a successful operation may be defined in strategic, tactical, and
reputational gains of organizations and persons and computed by changes in
their political, social, and moral capital.3 In this sense the casualties associated
with terrorist attacks are unimportant in themselves; they are always means to
some other end. At the same time this should not lead us to underplay their
significance, since without the casualties the purposes of those responsible for
them would not be achieved. Suicide attacks not only kill people but are
designed to do so. When they fail to kill, they also fail in their wider purposes.
Correspondingly, if the underlying purpose of counter-terrorism is to defeat
terrorism, one of its intermediate goals must be to safeguard the intended
victims.
A second literature of relevance is that concerned with citizen response to
natural and technological disasters. Longstanding findings of empirical
research show that, in the acute phase of such emergencies, bystanders may
experience fear, commonly rationalized as “panic,” but despite this they
remain fully capable of purposeful action. They use the available information
to guide their actions, and act to reduce danger to themselves and others. They
are not demoralized or reduced to aimless panic or wild flight; only under very
specific conditions do they try to save themselves at the expense of others or
cease to respect the lives and property of others. 4 On the contrary,
community-oriented or altruistic behaviour may become widespread and
persist for days, weeks, or months.5 Opportunities to extend these lines of
research to situations arising from terrorism have been limited, however.
Much government planning for emergencies generally, and specifically for
terrorist operations, continues to be driven by expectations that citizens will
display passivity or helplessness in the face of emergencies and, if provided
with full information about current threats, will use it in irrational or antisocial
ways.6 Empirical study of citizens’ behaviour when under attack by terrorists
can thus widen our knowledge of citizen responses to emergencies and also
further inform government plans to manage terrorist threats.
In the present paper I will look at the intervention of bystanders in 103
suicide attacks that took place in Israel between November 2000 and
3November 2003. The pattern of outcomes of Palestinian terrorist attacks has
received some attention recently but discussion has been largely confined to
descriptive measures of trend and composition.7 There is scope for closer
analysis. What is the extent of variation in the immediate outcomes of suicide
attacks, measured by the number of casualties, and what are the main sources
of variation that we can measure? We will find a relatively small number of
operations with high yield measured by the number of casualties, and a much
larger number with a relatively low yield. What factors contribute most to
explaining the low-yielding outcomes, and where does citizen response figure
among them?
A significant effect of bystander intervention would have practical
implications for counter-terrorism policies and the management of terrorist
threats. Standard assessments of the scope for counter-measures distinguish
three phases: prevention, absorption, and reconstruction.8 It may be that,
between prevention and absorption, we should identify another distinct stage
in which intervention can significantly affect outcomes: that of the attack
when it is actually in progress.
The present paper makes a first pass at these problems. First it gives a
simple account of what we will call the “technology” of violence. Then, it
describes the general patterns in the data. In this context, it goes on to deal
specifically with the descriptive statistics relating to bystander intervention.
Finally, it engages in some simple multivariate analysis.
1. The Technology of Violence
What makes the outcomes of suicide attacks vary? The number of victims V
arising from the ith incident in a series can be thought of as depending on the
size of the locally vulnerable population N multiplied by a probability p that
each will be victimized, plus a random error u, so i i i iV p N u   .
The number at risk, N, is essentially a matter of the place and time of the
attack, such as a military checkpoint, an open-air market, or a crowded
building. It might be affected by the history of previous attacks; unanticipated
changes in the location of attacks, for example, are likely to cause potential
victims to alter their behaviour by avoiding places of increased risk, so
reducing the vulnerable population.
The probability p of victimization depends on the technology of the
suicide operation, broadly defined. Technology embraces the techniques by
which the faction recruits, screens, motivates, and commits the attacker
psychologically; the techniques for concealment that allow the attacker to
infiltrate the target location; the technical device, for example a car bomb or
an explosive belt; and the personal qualities of the attacker that bear upon the
will and ability to execute the attack.
An important aspect of technology in this broad sense is operational know-
how, which is of two kinds, explicit and tacit. The explicit part of the
knowledge required to organise a suicide mission can be acquired through
passive study and does not rely on organization. Acquisition of the tacit
component requires individuals to engage in learning-by-doing and relies on
an organization to store and share the lessons of experience; Robert Pape notes
that this is one objective of al-Qaeda.9 The importance of tacit knowledge
helps to explain why there is almost always an organization involved; suicide
4attacks are rarely if ever mounted spontaneously by individuals. For present
purposes, therefore, the technology of a given suicide operation comprises not
only the techniques used directly to mount the attack but also the common
knowledge available from all previous suicide operations, and the private
knowledge that the faction has built up for itself from its own previous
operations.
Finally, a given technology has given scope for disruption. An operation
can fail because of bad luck, because the operative’s motivation can fail, or
because of intentional counter-action by adversaries or intended victims.
In short, when an attack takes place, some people will be there and will be
at risk. The risk they face depends first and foremost on the technology of the
operation. There is a set of things that the faction tries to control: “vision,
location, and timing.” But in a given place and time the given technology can
be disrupted. The faction chooses the technology, but the bystanders can also
choose to intervene; if they do so, it may affect the outcome. Finally, luck will
take a hand. The statistics will let us weigh these factors and set the role of
citizen response in context.
2. What the Data Show
The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzlia, Israel,
provides a searchable on-line database of terrorist actions in the Arab-Israeli
conflict, with details of terrorist attacks in Israel since September 2000.10 The
incidents are characterized by the date and place of the attack; the type of
attack, e.g. a suicide operation; the character of the target and device
employed; the organizational affiliation of the attacker, and the number of
victims killed and injured. There is a brief textual description of the incident.
The individual casualties are given personal attributes such as name, age, sex,
nationality, and religion, often accompanied by brief biographical details and a
note, not in standard form, of any role they may have played in the incident. 11
For present purposes the data are drawn from a three-year period
beginning on 6 November 2000, when the first suicide operation included in
the database is reported, and finishing on 3 November 2003.12 I curtail the
sample then because the frequency of incidents was falling sharply at that
point. After a long period in which every month had seen two or more attacks,
more than six weeks passed between the last attack in the sample and the next,
on 22 December 2003. There was one in January 2004 and none in February
before a new cluster in March. The reason for the change in pattern was the
new situation arising from the approaching completion of Israel’s security
fence and the turn to assassination of Palestinian faction leaders.13 Over this
period the database reports 103 suicide attacks which, coded numerically,
yield the figures shown in Table 1.
5Table 1. Suicide Attacks, November 2000 to November 2003: Observed
Characteristics
Incidents, total number 103
Victims, total number 3516
Of which, Deaths 440
Injuries 3076
Casualties per incident 34.1
Attackers, total number 112
Of which, Male 100
Female 7
Not known 5
Casualties per attacker (“adjusted” casualties) 31.4
Average age of attacker, years 21.7
Age not known, number of attackers 15
Attack employed:
Personal device 87
Car 14
Boat 2
Attack was aimed at:
Civilian target 76
Military target 10
Uncertain 17
Attack was sponsored by:
Hamas 44
Martyrs of al-Aqsa Brigade 26
Palestinian Islamic Jihad 24
Other or not known 9
Attack was prevented 2
Attack took place in or at:
Street 32
Checkpoint 16
Travel Stop 15
Bus 14
Café 14
Store 7
Offshore 2
Residence 1
Attacker was challenged 40
Note. “Personal device” was a bag, belt, or vest carried on the attacker’s person.
2.1. How Effective are Suicide Attacks?
On average each incident recorded in this dataset caused 4.3 deaths and 29.9
injuries, making 34.1 for the total of victims of an average incident. The
number of deaths is therefore below the worldwide average of 13 per incident
for suicide attacks over the period from 1980 to 2001, excluding 9/11, but
above the average of less than one per incident for all kinds of terrorism over
that period.14
The attacks that we are looking at were highly variable in effectiveness:
just 15 attacks caused half of the more than 3,500 combined deaths and
6injuries, while 22 killed nobody but the perpetrator. The incidents may be
ranked in increasing order of the number of casualties (deaths plus injuries).
Figure 1 charts the cumulative percentage of casualties against the cumulative
percentage of incidents. It is a Lorenz curve of the kind often used to measure
inequality. If all attacks were equally effective, the result would be a
diagonally rising straight line. In fact the relationship is highly curved and this
reflects the variation in effectiveness.
Figure 1. Casualties and Incidents: Cumulative, Per Cent of Totals
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The sample is confined to operations that reached the final stage of
execution and excludes a much larger number that were abandoned or
disrupted by the security forces at a preparatory stage. According to statistics
published by the Israeli Ministry of Defence, no attacks were intercepted in
the last four months of 2000 but the number rose to 21 intercepted in 2001,
and 112 and 179 in 2002 and the first eleven months of 2003 respectively,
making 312 in total.15 Over the same period the ICT database shows 103
attacks, 101 of which were carried through in some form. Including the attacks
that were abandoned or intercepted, failed attacks appear to have outnumbered
attacks that were executed by three to one. These are absent from the
distribution that we analyse below, since we lack knowledge of the statistical
correlates of the incidents that did not happen.
2.2. Single Operatives and Accomplices
The suicide attackers responsible for the incidents recorded in the dataset did
not work alone. Each was recruited and motivated by a factional organization,
and supported logistically by two or three aides in a “martyrdom cell.”16 At the
moment of execution, however, most were left alone with their victims.
In nine incidents, however, two assailants coordinated their actions.
Working together, did two achieve more or less than they would have done
separately? At first sight returns were diminishing. If the number of casualties
is divided by the number of attackers, then “adjusted casualties” are 31.4 per
perpetrator, somewhat less than the average of 34.1 per incident. The average
number of victims of two assailants working together was 47.6 compared with
732.9 for one: in other words doubling the number of operatives did not double
the number of casualties but increased it by about half.
2.3. Attackers’ Age and Sex
Age is reported for 98 of the 112 attackers. The average was 21.7 years. There
was limited variation around this figure: the youngest was 16 and the oldest
48, but 88 of the 98 were aged between 17 and 26. As a result there was no
significant relationship between the number of victims of a suicide attack and
the age of the attacker.
Only a few attackers, 7 out of 112, were women. Of the remainder 92 were
known to be male, leaving 4 for whom sex is not reported; one supposes that
these too are likely to have been men. The female attackers are surprisingly
few given the intense publicization of their role in the media. In all cases they
completed their operations alone. Their involvement in an operation was
associated with a large increase in the number of casualties. The average
number of victims of an attack by a woman was 60.4, compared with 33.6
when the assailant was male.
The data do not capture other personal qualities that are likely to have
influenced the operational effectiveness of the attacker, for example personal
maturity, appearance, the education and training required to execute complex
tasks, experience of Israeli society, and fluency in Hebrew.17 Nor do we learn
anything about their immediate logistical support.
2.4. Devices
In most incidents, 87 out of 103, the attacker’s weapon of choice was a bag,
belt, or vest laden with explosives and carried on their person. In 14 cases a
car bomb was used, and in two cases explosive were loaded onto a boat. The
number of casualties that resulted varied strongly. The average number of
casualties in an incident involving an attacker using a personal device was
38.7, compared with 10.2 victims of the average car bomb and only 2.0 where
a boat was used. These differences arose partly because the choices between
alternative devices were to some extent linked to other choices, between
military versus civilian targets and between available locations for an attack.
2.5. Military Versus Civilian Targets
The majority of attacks, 76 out of 103, were clearly aimed at civilian targets.
In 10 cases the intended target appears to have been armed security personnel;
for example an attacker deliberately detonated explosives beside a military
vehicle or a police station. In the remaining 17 cases the intended target was
unclear, usually because the attack was triggered by a security operation, or
the operation was interrupted or prevented. In most of the “uncertain” cases
the security forces took the force of the attack but may not have been the
intended victims and in some cases their assessment after the event was that
the attacker had been en route to some other intended target.
Not surprisingly, the figures suggest that civilians provided a “softer,”
more vulnerable target. The average number of casualties of attacks clearly
aimed at civilians was 45.9, compared with 1.8 casualties in attacks aimed at
military or armed security personnel, and 0.6 casualties in those attacks that
could not be classified.
82.6. Location of Attacks
The outcome of an attack varied strongly with its location. Each incident is
classified according to whether it occurred in the street or a bus, at a bus stop
or train station, in a store or café, or at a checkpoint or roadblock. Two
incidents occurred offshore when terrorists directed a boat loaded with
explosives against a naval vessel. One occurred when an attacker broke into a
settler’s home. Finally, two attacks were physically prevented and thus did not
take place anywhere.
Table 2. Location: Incidents and Casualties
Number of
incidents
Casualties
per incident
Attack was prevented 2 0.0
Attack took place in or at:
Café 14 68.3
Bus 14 50.5
Travel stop 15 41.3
Street 32 31.2
Store 7 30.3
Offshore 2 2.0
Checkpoint 16 1.2
Residence 1 1.0
All incidents 103 34.1
Table 2 shows that the most favoured location was the street and the
average street incident resulted in 31.2 casualties. The deadliest location,
however, was cafés and restaurants, where 14 attacks averaged 68.3 casualties.
The table ranks locations in descending order of the casualties associated with
an attack on each. At the lower extreme, 14 attacks on checkpoints yielded
only 1.2 casualties on average. Not surprisingly, a condition for high casualties
was the gathering of people in a street market or shopping mall, or in a queue
for public transport; casualties were increased where the explosion was
contained within a structure such as a bus or a building.
2.7. Factions
Three factions carried out the great majority of the 103 operations. Table 1
showed that 94 attacks were carried out by just three organizations: Hamas
(the Islamic Resistance Movement), the Martyrs of al-Aqsa Brigade (the
terrorist wing of Fatah), and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Of the others two were
carried out by Fatah itself, one by Fatah Tanzim, and one by the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine. Five are unattributed; this could mean either
that no organization was involved or, more likely, that the organization
involved was not reported.
Table 3 shows that there was considerable variation in the casualties
associated with incidents sponsored by the different organizations. Hamas,
which mounted 43 per cent of the attacks, was responsible for 56 per cent of
the injuries and 69 per cent of the deaths. The proportion of deaths in total
casualties, therefore, was also higher for Hamas attacks than for others. On
average, each Hamas operation resulted in 46.1 casualties compared with 28.7
9casualties when the Martyrs of al-Aqsa Brigade claimed responsibility and
22.8 when the attack was attributed to Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Table 3. The Factions: Incidents and Casualties
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Totals of:
Incidents 103 44 26 24 9
Deaths 440 302 70 59 9
Injuries 3076 1725 676 487 188
Casualties 3516 2027 746 546 197
Per cent of row totals:
Incidents 100 43 25 23 9
Deaths 100 69 16 13 2
Injuries 100 56 22 16 6
Casualties 100 58 21 16 6
Deaths, per cent of casualties 13 15 9 11 5
Casualties per incident 34.1 46.1 28.7 22.8 21.9
Some of the difference in outcomes can be associated with variations in
the distinct modus operandi that each organization developed. But most of the
operational differences that we can observe are not large. Table 4 shows that
the factions overwhelmingly recruited young men. Hamas did not recruit
women at all over the period covered, sponsoring an attack by a female suicide
operative for the first time on 18 January 2004. The factions shared similar
preferences for a “personal device” (a bag, belt, or vest) and for a civilian
target. Hardly any attacks in the dataset were prevented. There were a few
differences in the locations associated with the attacks mounted by each
faction; Hamas appears to have become master of the bus bombing. Generally,
at least three quarters of the operations mounted by each of the factions
succeeded in reaching targets of higher or intermediate average value, but not
all then realized the value that was average for the target.
The largest visible difference among the factions was in the rate of
challenge to which their operations were liable. Less than one quarter of
attacks by Hamas were challenged compared with half or more of those
mounted by the Martyrs of al-Aqsa Brigade or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. I
discuss this further in the next section.
The data confirm that Hamas had a more effective technology, or
organizational modus operandi, for suicide operations. In general, modus
operandi reflects both collective qualities of the organization and qualities of
the individuals that the organization employs. We will consider these briefly.
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Incidents, total number 103 44 26 24 9
Attackers 112 46 28 28 10
Of which, females, where
known 7 0 3 3 1
Average age of attacker,
where known, years 21.7 22.8 19.0 23.0 21.9
Per cent of incidents:
Device:
Personal device 84 86 85 79 89
Car 14 11 15 17 11
Boat 2 2 0 4 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Target:
Civilian target 74 77 69 79 56
Military target 10 14 4 4 22
Uncertain 17 9 27 17 22
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Attack was prevented 2 2 0 4 0
Attack took place at or in:
Café 14 16 12 17 0
Bus 14 25 0 13 0
Travel Stop 15 18 12 17 0
Street 31 20 38 29 67
Store 7 2 15 4 11
Offshore 2 2 0 4 0
Checkpoint 16 14 23 8 22
Residence 1 0 0 4 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Attacker was challenged 39 23 58 50 33
A collective attribute of possible significance is experience shared through
teamwork. Did organized learning-by-doing raise the effectiveness of some
attacks above others? The first and last rows of Table 3 could be read in such
as way as to support this hypothesis: thus Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
responsible for only 24 operations, achieved only 22.8 casualties per
operation; the Martyrs of al-Aqsa Brigades mounted 26 operations that yielded
28.7 casualties on average; Hamas, which mounted the largest number of
operations, 44, achieved the highest average casualties of 46.1 per operation.
But the learning-by-doing hypothesis fails a more discriminating test. If
learning was at work we should expect clear upward trends over time in the
casualties per incident that each faction mounted. This is not the case; the time
trends of casualties achieved by each faction were approximately flat over the
period studied.18 Thus it seems not to have been the case that the factions
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gradually learned from experience to select more effective operatives or
devices, or higher-value targets, or to control disruption more effectively; if
experience was a factor, it was wholly acquired before November 2000.19
Evidence of learning by the factions may be obscured if their adversaries
were learning contemporaneously. During this period Israeli society and its
security forces were also working out how to disrupt suicide operations. The
evidence of the Israeli defense ministry, already cited, showed a rising trend in
the number of intercepted attacks over the period. The present dataset provides
some support for this view: 27 per cent of attacks were challenged in the
period from November 2000 to December 2001, but the rate of challenge rose
to 45 per cent in 2002. It then levelled off, standing at 42 per cent in 2003.
Individual-level factors that could have contributed to differences in
factional outcomes do not emerge directly from the data, which provide little
information about the qualities of attackers other than age and sex. An obvious
possibility, though, is that Hamas mounted more effective operations because
it was able to attract volunteers of higher average quality or could select for
higher quality because its volunteers were more numerous relative to the
vacancies. Its relative success in operations is most simply explained if Hamas
operatives had superior education and experience and this gave them a
“passport” to move more freely into and through Israeli society.
Eli Berman and David D. Laitin suggest that Hamas secured an advantage
vis à vis the other factions by positioning itself at the fundamentalist end of the
market for terrorists; this allowed it to recruit from the more committed, more
qualified segment of the distribution of volunteers. In this way Hamas made
itself a “strong” club with an enhanced propensity for more and deadlier
suicide attacks.20 We see that, despite being the more efficient operator,
Hamas did not take over the other factions or drive them out of the political
market place. The others exploited greater theological flexibility to
compensate for an inferior modus operandi by employing women, for
example, a tactic that Hamas did not allow itself to copy until the end of 2003.
Thus, the logic of organizational rivalry allowed practices of varying
efficiency to persist side by side.
3. Bystanders’ Intervention
In a high proportion of incidents, 40 out of 103, one or more of those affected
were not passively victimized but are reported to have intervened in the
process of the attack and potentially influenced its outcome.21
Intervention took several forms. Civilian witnesses or security personnel
became suspicious and intervened to challenge or restrain an attacker, or
called the security forces. Security personnel challenged attackers by acting on
suspicion or information. Routine security measures at checkpoints or
roadblocks sometimes uncovered terrorists who may have been en route to
other targets, or intended specifically to target military personnel at the
checkpoint concerned, or had formed the intention simply to proceed until
challenged. Table 5 shows that of the 16 incidents at checkpoints or
roadblocks 9 were triggered by challenges, but this also means that most
challenges took place in other contexts; the largest number of challenges took
place in the street.
The result of a challenge was almost always to trigger the attack; only in
two cases was an attack actually prevented. On the other hand a challenge is
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likely to have had the effect that the attacker lost the initiative and became
unable to choose the time and place of the attack.
While the person who intervened often became a victim it was sometimes
claimed that many lives were saved as a result. Thus a security guard was
killed preventing an attacker from entering a Jerusalem café on 8 September
2003. Afterwards his brother said: “I’m sure he knew he was stopping a
terrorist. He saved at least 30 lives.” This repeated a similar incident at the
entrance to a shopping mall in Afula on 19 May when two security guards
saved “countless lives”; one was killed and the other severely injured. On 19
June 2003 an Israeli shopkeeper confronted a young man who had entered his
store carrying explosives; the police concluded that the intended target was a
nearby bus stop and stated: “We have no doubt that the store owner paid with
his life to save others.” On 4 October a restaurant security guard also “paid
with his life in order to protect others, whether they were Arabs or Jews. We
are all brothers in this country” (his own brother’s words).
The statistics lend support to this hypothesis. Table 5, col. 6, shows that in
every class of location a challenge tended to reduce the number of casualties
associated with an attack: either the challengers took the force of the explosion
or some of the bystanders were given time to save themselves. Overall, the
average number of casualties in an incident that was interrupted by bystanders
was 16.9, compared with 45.1 when the attacker was allowed to carry out the
operation without distraction, a difference of 28.2 victims.
Table 5. Bystanders’ Intervention: Incidents, Casualties, and Location
Number of
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attacker was:
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attack was
prevented 2 0 100 0.0 … …
Attack took
place in or at:
Café 3 11 21 53.0 72.5 –19.5
Bus 3 11 21 19.0 59.1 –40.1
Travel stop 7 8 47 39.9 42.5 –2.6
Street 13 19 41 12.8 43.8 –31.0
Store 2 5 29 0.5 42.2 –41.7
Offshore 1 1 50 4.0 … …
Checkpoint 9 7 56 1.1 1.3 –0.2
Residence 0 1 0 … 1.0 …
All incidents 40 63 39 16.9 45.1 –28.2
The arithmetic of Table 5 may understate the true difference made by
interventions. At first sight many challenges saved few lives; those at
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checkpoints, for example, resulted in hardly any saving of casualties. This
assumes, however, that the general pattern of attacks would have remained
unchanged in the absence of interventions. Possibly, however, challenges in
low-value locations prevented attackers from proceeding to higher-value
targets. If the targets in Israeli society were arrayed in order of diminishing
value, based on Table 2, they would form steps on a ladder:
Café
Bus
Bus stop
Store
Street
Checkpoint
The higher-value targets at the top of the ladder were cafés and buses;
intermediate targets were commuter queues and shoppers in crowded streets
and stores. Checkpoints, along with private homes and naval facilities, were
targets of lower value. Think of the typical attacker as setting out to climb this
ladder: to reach a café she had to pass a checkpoint, walk along a street, enter
and leave a store, wait for a bus, and travel on it to the destination. At each
step the attacker was screened by the watchful eyes of soldiers, security
guards, shoppers, and commuters. By passing each step without challenge she
gained access to a target of higher value. If challenged at any stage, she ended
the game in sudden death. If this is the right analogy, then the effectiveness of
screening is measured not just by the victims saved at each step but also by
those saved because some attackers were challenged before they could reach
targets of higher value.
What factors favoured intervention? It is sometimes suggested that women
have been used in suicide attacks because they are less likely to be challenged
than men. The data do not support this view, although the number of
observations is small. Of the seven female attackers in the dataset four were
challenged; thus women were challenged with higher frequency than men.
Only one was challenged at a checkpoint, however.
Table 6 shows that the identity of the sponsoring faction was also an
important influence. Less than one quarter of Hamas operations encountered a
challenge compared with more than half of all other operations. This is not
because Hamas operations were biased towards locations where challenges
were less likely to be mounted. Hamas operatives were less likely to be
challenged in any given location, including checkpoints.
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Table 6. Bystanders’ Intervention in Hamas Operations: Incidents, Casualties
per Incident, and Location
Number of Hamas
operations where
attacker was:
Rate of
challenge, % of
operations:
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attack was
prevented 1 0 100 100 0
Attack took
place in or at:
Café 1 6 14 29 –14
Bus 1 10 9 67 –58
Travel stop 3 5 38 57 –20
Street 2 7 22 48 –26
Store 0 1 0 33 –33
Offshore 0 1 0 100 –100
Checkpoint 2 4 33 70 –37
Residence 0 0 … 0 …
All incidents 10 34 23 51 –28
Note. Column (3) is col. (1) divided by the sum of cols (1) and (2). Col. (4) is the same for all
other incidents, obtained by subtracting figures for Hamas operations in this table from the
figures for all incidents shown in Table 5. Col. (5) is col. (3), less col. (4).
The actions of citizens who intervened in suicide operations that were
already under way appear to deserve special note. As studies of citizen
response in other emergency settings would lead us to expect, those caught up
in suicide attacks may take purposeful action to reduce the threat to others.
Tragically, however, this response is likely to increase the danger to
themselves since the attack is often precipitated as a result.
4. Multivariate Analysis
Controlling for variation in other independent variables can shed more light on
the roles of the attacker, the faction, and the bystanders in generating
casualties. For this I estimate several regression models using ordinary least
squares. As before, the number of victims V arising from the ith incident in a
series depends on the size of the locally vulnerable population N multiplied by
a probability p that each will be victimized, plus a random error u, so
i i i iV p N u   . Then N comprises a set of target attributes including whether
the target personnel were civilian or military and their location; p is set by the
attributes of the technology including the qualities of the attacker, the device,
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the sponsoring faction, and their susceptibility to bystander intervention. The
dependent and independent variables are detailed below.
Dependent Variable
Victims The number of casualties reported as killed and injured in an
incident.
Independent Variables: Target Attributes
The following variable stands for the status of the population attacked.
Civilian Equals 1 when civilians were the target and 0 when military
personnel were attacked or the intended target was uncertain.
The following variables characterise Location and are mutually exclusive. The
default location is the street; this includes a number of cases where the
attacker was prevented from entering a café or store.
Bus Equals 1 for an attack inside a bus and 0 otherwise.
Café Equals 1 for an attack inside a café or restaurant and 0
otherwise.
Checkpoint Equals 1 for an attack at a checkpoint or roadblock and 0
otherwise.
Offshore Equals 1 for an attack offshore and 0 otherwise.
Residence Equals 1 for an attack inside a private residence and 0
otherwise.
Store Equals 1 for an attack inside a store and 0 otherwise.
Travel Stop Equals 1 for an attack at a bus stop or train station and 0
otherwise. Includes some cases where the attacker was
preventing from entering a bus.
Independent Variables: Technology
The following variables characterise the technology employed in the
operation, including the qualities of the operative, the device, the sponsoring
organization, and the realized scope for intervention
Female Equals 1 when the attacker was reported as female and 0
otherwise.
Second Equals 1 when there were two attackers and 0 otherwise.
I do not consider the attacker’s age given the number of missing observations
and the lack of variation in the ages that are observed.
Vehicle Equals 1 when the bomb was conveyed by a car or boat, and 0
when it was carried about the person in a bag, belt, or vest.
Hamas Equals 1 when the faction was Hamas and 0 when the faction
was the Martyrs of al-Aqsa Brigade, Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
or another faction.
Challenge Equals 1 when the attack was interrupted or precipitated by a
challenge and 0 otherwise.
Some restrictions on the testing procedure arise from the presence of weak
multicollinearity among supposedly independent variables. I use a correlation
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matrix (not reported) and a severe test (R > 0.5). There is little to worry about
in general but enough covariation of Civilian with Vehicle, Checkpoint, and
Offshore to invite caution. Offshore targets were always military and were
always approached by boat. Car or truck bombs tended to be used against
military targets; checkpoints were always staffed by security personnel. On
this reasoning I test the influence of the locational variables and Device in one
regression model and that of Civilian in another. In Table 7, Models 1 and 2
test the relationship:
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
i j ij i i
j
i i i i
V Location Female Second
Vehicle Hamas Challenge u
   
  
      
      

where i indexes the incident and j indexes the attributes of location; Model 3
tests the relationship:
0 1 2 3
4 5
i i i i
i i i
V Civilian Female Second
Hamas Challenge u
   
 
      
    
Table 7 shows the results. These indicate that the outcome of a suicide
attack was strongly influenced by the choices of the attacker, but other agents
and chance also took a hand. The slope coefficients show the marginal
contribution to the number of casualties that arises from the existence of each
independent factor, controlling for variation in the others, relative to a base
case. All the coefficients have the expected sign, positive or negative. Many
are significant, both statistically and in the sense that their size is of practical
importance for the numbers of victims. One symptom of multicollinearity in
regression output is high R-Squareds combined with low statistical
significance of slope coefficients; the results in Table 7 show an opposite
pattern and this suggests that multicollinearity has been managed successfully.
The outcome in the base case is shown by the value of the intercept. The
base case for Models 1 and 2 is a lone male not associated with Hamas who
detonates a personal device in the street without meeting a challenge, and the
number of casualties expected in this case is 27 (Model 1) or 30 (Model 2).
Some targets yielded much higher casualties than others; the difference
between attacking a café and a checkpoint could be 50 or 60 killed and
injured. The use of a female attacker or an accomplice would each raise the
expected numbers of victims by 30 or 35, and an association with Hamas
would raise it by 16 or 20, even when other factors were held constant.
The intervention of bystanders also made a difference and probably saved
18 casualties on each occasion. This is a smaller figure than the one previously
derived from Table 5 for the following reason. Table 5 (“All incidents,” col. 6)
gave us the average saving, 28 casualties, associated with bystander
intervention; this figure is not controlled for other variables. Table 7 (cols 1
and 2) tells us that the marginal saving from bystander intervention was 18
casualties, holding other variables constant. As before, this assumes that the
distribution of attacks was independent of the rate of challenge; a larger
estimate of the marginal saving would be justified if it could be shown that
challenges in low-value locations reduced the number of incidents in high-
value locations.
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Table 7. Factors Influencing the Effects of Suicide Attacks, November 2000 to November 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observations 103 103 103 59 42
R-Squared 0.378 0.353 0.370 0.378 0.325
F 4.568 *** 7.416 *** 11.412 *** 8.221 *** 9.386 ***
Independent Variables:
Intercept 27.444 *** 30.801 *** −6.879 −2.533 11.575
Bus 14.408 .. .. .. ..
Café 34.228 *** 28.960 *** .. .. ..
Checkpoint −24.081 ** −27.044 *** .. .. ..
Offshore −27.275 .. .. .. ..
Residence −26.444 .. .. .. ..
Store 0.702 .. .. .. ..
Travel Stop 11.041 .. .. .. ..
Civilian .. .. 43.731 *** 34.439 *** 50.215 ***
Female 35.363 ** 34.978 ** 39.985 *** 39.839 *** ..
Second 34.151 ** 30.992 ** 32.529 ** 18.652 ..
Vehicle −14.139 −19.461 * .. .. ..
Hamas 15.963 * 19.591 ** 21.081 *** .. ..
Challenge −18.173 ** −17.590 ** −14.981 * −7.248 −31.726 **
Coverage:
(1), (2), and (3) include full sample.
(4) excludes Hamas observations.
(5) includes Hamas observations only but excludes 2 observations where a second attacker took part.
Key:
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
18
These results are robust in that they are present in all the models tested and
so can be shown to hold regardless of the exact specification of the remaining
characteristics of the attack. Thus Model 1 incorporates detailed information
on the location of an attack and the device employed. Some details prove not
to be significant. When they are discarded in Model 2, the size and
significance of the remaining coefficients is broadly unaffected. In Model 3
the characteristics of location and device are replaced by the characteristics of
the target. Again the coefficients on the attacker, faction, and challenge
variables prove to be stable and still significant.
The base scenario of Model 3 is a lone male not associated with Hamas
who attacks a military target without meeting a challenge. The number of
casualties expected in this case is shown by the intercept, which is negative.
This is not as it should be and suggests that the model could be misspecified.
On the other hand the value of the intercept is small and is not significantly
different from zero.22 A plausible reading is that a lone male not associated
with Hamas who attacked a military target without meeting a challenge tended
to succeed only in blowing up himself. The other coefficients are significant,
have the expected signs, and have plausible values. In fact the explanatory
power of Model 3 measured by its R-Squared is about the same as that of
Model 1 but it achieves this level of explanation with fewer independent
variables; this makes it more efficient and is reflected in its larger F statistic.
Since higher effectiveness is associated with the use of a female attacker, a
second attacker, and the involvement of Hamas, but Hamas used a second
attacker on only two occasions and did not use female attackers at all, the
marginal contribution of a female attacker or an accomplice in incidents not
associated with Hamas may be under- or overstated by regressions that include
Hamas-linked incidents. Model 4 repeats the exercise of Model 3 using data
from incidents not linked to Hamas. This shows almost no change in the
estimated size and significance of the marginal contribution of a female
attacker, but the coefficients associated with a second attacker and a challenge
become smaller and lose significance. Model 5 repeats the regression using
data restricted to Hamas-linked incidents involving a lone attacker. Here we
find that the effect of a challenge becomes very significant and quite large, of
the order of 30 victims spared. In other words, interventions were highly
productive when they were mounted against Hamas operations, which were
likely to be more effective than others’ in the absence of a challenge. Table 4
showed, however, that Hamas attacks were also less likely to be challenged.
In all the models the R-Squared is between 32 and 38 per cent; this
indicates that the greater part of the variation in effectiveness remains
unexplained. It is not clear whether the unexplained variation reflects omitted
variables that could potentially be measured and taken into account, or
influences that were intrinsically random and cannot be controlled.
5. Conclusions
We began by noting that the outcomes of the four suicide hijackings on 9/11
appeared to vary with the character of interaction between the terrorists and
their captors. The present study of 103 suicide operations in Israel suggests
that this was not accidental. The outcomes of suicide attacks depended on
many factors ranging from the location of the attack to the qualities of the
attacker and the identity of the faction that organized it. Controlling for these,
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the interaction between bombers and bystanders also influenced the numbers
of victims arising. Military personnel at checkpoints, security guards in
shopping malls and cafés, and civilian commuters and shoppers could all play
a role. The number of victims spared death or injury when bystanders
intervened, taking other variables as given, was 18 per incident across the
whole dataset and more than 30 per incident if we consider only Hamas
operations.
These findings confirm that some of the patterns found from the study of
natural and technological disasters may also be found in terrorist emergencies.
Citizens under attack are not inevitably reduced to passivity or helplessness;
even in largely unanticipated “flash” emergencies that demand instant
response they are likely to display varying degrees of altruistic or community-
oriented behaviour.
There are immediate implications for the design of security policy. A
society under attack by suicide terrorists can protect itself by active security
measures, and these should not be limited to before and after the event. In the
case of Israel it is clear that the readiness of citizens to take action against
suicide operations that were actually in progress had a considerable effect in
protecting potential victims and limiting casualties. Some casualties were
inevitable, however, and those who took action were usually the first to suffer.
These conclusions should be considered preliminary. One obstacle to
further progress is the effort required to establish more comprehensive datasets
on suicide operations that can be analysed numerically. The present analysis of
a relatively narrow dataset suggests that more systematic data collection would
pay substantial dividends. More data on the personal qualities of the suicide
operatives and on the counter-measures locally in place at the time of each
incident could be especially informative.
The qualities and actions of the bystanders who die to save others also
merit closer examination. If it is of interest to study why some die so as to kill,
it may also repay study to find out why some die in order to save life. More
detailed investigation of the different contexts and consequences of citizen
response would also be useful. It may appear from the present study that
citizens suspecting a suicide attack should be advised to have a go in the hope
of saving the lives of others, but expect to die themselves. Whether doing
anything is always better than doing nothing, however, will emerge more
clearly when it is possible to carry out statistical comparisons of the
consequences of different actions in different contexts.
Finally, a more general qualification is in order. Vigilance is costly, and
the data do not give us any indication of whether Israel achieved the right level
of watchfulness against suicide attacks given its price. The main cost of
vigilance is probably indirect: that of transforming a relatively open, trusting
society into a more closed community, suspicious of differences in facial
appearance, dress, and manner, and permanently on guard against strangers.
This also merits scholarly evaluation.
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